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Abstract
This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its
chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game laboratory experiment
in which giving entails an efficiency gain. Before the dictator decides, the recipient can
send a free-form text message to the dictator. We find that the content of a message and
its form do matter in the decision to give. Putting effort into the message by writing in
a humorous and creative way pays off. We argue that this can be interpreted in terms
of reciprocity. Mentioning reasons why the money is needed increases the generosity of
dictators as well. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female
dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to
messages that emphasize the specific power and responsibility of the dictator.
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1 Introduction
There are numerous situations in which one person asks another one a favor. A person on the
street asking you for money, a roommate asking you to share your food with her, a charity
organization asking you for a donation or a stranger asking you to share your place on a bench
in a beer garden are just some examples of many. These social interactions differ in several
aspects. The person that asks you could be familiar or unfamiliar, she may be more to your
liking or less, she could be the beneficiary of the favor or just an intermediary (e.g. a charity
organization), and you may be asked verbally or in written form. However, what most of
these situations have in common is that doing somebody a favor or sharing something with
someone is welfare-improving, in the sense that the party benefitting from the favor has a
higher marginal utility for the requested good.
In this paper, we are interested in the effect of communication on the decision to do some-
thing for or share something with someone. More precisely, we are mainly interested in the
content and form of written communication, i.e. which arguments are more or less successful
and whether there are other aspects of written communication that systematically increase or
decrease the chance of a successful request. Apart from providing advice for communication
in interpersonal interactions, our research may be useful for charity organizations that try to
convince potential donors to give money, other goods or time to a particular cause. In the
area of business science, our findings might be of interest for research on negotiations, e.g.
when analyzing which aspects of communication are beneficial in attempts to convince the
other party to agree to a specific arrangement.
In order to study our research question, we conducted a controlled laboratory experiment in
which subjects participated in a modified dictator game. Dictators made a binary decision
to either share their endowment with the receiver or to keep their endowment for themselves.
The decision to share their endowment with the receiver resulted in a decrease in the payoff
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to the dictator and an increase in the sum of payoffs to both players, representing the wel-
fare improvement of a kind action mentioned above. Before making their decision, dictators
received a free-form message written by the receiver.
We find clear evidence that both the content of a message and its form influence the dictator’s
decision to give. Furthermore, messages that show that the author exerted effort by writing
a long note without many spelling mistakes, as well as messages that are humorous, exhibit
higher chances of success. It seems that if the author of a message is “kind” to the dictator by
putting effort into a creative message and its correct form, the dictator will be more inclined
to also act kindly and share the money. Hence, we argue that this can be explained by a
reciprocity motive. Additionally, informing potential givers as to the reasons why the money
is specifically needed is shown to be an effective way of increasing generosity. Moreover, our
results indicate that there are some differences in the responses of male and female dictators.
Arguing that generosity will increase the sum of the payoffs will improve the chances of a
successful request only for male dictators. Women, on the other hand, react positively to
statements acknowledging their specific power and responsibility, and to messages that con-
tain the word “thanks,” a word which is usually used as a closing remark, such as “thanks in
advance.” We argue that both characteristics of a message create social pressure in a subtle
way, and that women seem to react more strongly to this kind of social pressure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next, the relevant literature is discussed. Af-
terwards, we present the design of our experiment and introduce our message categories in
Section 3. Then, predictions regarding the dictators’ behavior originating from both theory
and previous results in the literature are debated in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results
of the experiment, which are subsequently discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
Situations in which one party can act altruistically1 towards another party and in which there
is no strategic interaction between these two parties have been studied extensively using the
dictator game in the experimental economics literature (starting with Kahneman et al., 1986;
Forsythe et al., 1994). In the original game, one party (the dictator) can decide how to divide
her endowment between herself and another party (the receiver). It has been found that a
significant fraction of people behave altruistically to some extent (see Engel, 2011, for a re-
view). Several explanations for this phenomenon have been mentioned in the literature over
the previous years, including social preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002), feelings of empathy towards
the other person (Batson et al., 1988; Batson, 2002; Andreoni and Rao, 2011; de Vignemont
and Singer, 2006; Edele et al., 2013), following social norms regarding fairness (Bolton et al.,
1998; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Zhao et al., 2017) which, in turn, is closely related to guilt
aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007)2 and self-image
concerns (Dana et al., 2007; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2013; Ploner and Regner, 2013).
Even though communication plays an important role in a variety of social interactions, includ-
ing the decision to do someone a favor, surprisingly few studies have implemented some sort
of communication into their experimental design. Allowing communication in an experiment
has the disadvantage that it reduces the level of control and that the analysis of the written
data is less straightforward than it would be with numerical data. This is particularly true
when free-form communication is used. Nevertheless, considering the great importance of
communication, it cannot be disregarded when studying social interactions.
Closest to our experiment is one by Andreoni and Rao (2011), in which either only the receiver,
1In the following, a behavioral definition by which altruistic acts are “costly acts that confer economic
benefits on other individuals”(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, p. 785) is used.
2However, Ellingsen et al. (2010) do not find evidence for guilt aversion in a dictator game.
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only the dictator, none of them or both can write a free-form message and, in the case of the
receiver, a numerical request as well. In the treatment most relevant to our research question,
in which only the receiver can communicate, givings are significantly higher than without
communication. The messages were categorized by independent raters into the categories of
Fairness, Friendly Greeting, Flattery, Acknowledge Power and Need. While communication by
itself (message + numerical request) has an effect on generosity, the content of the communi-
cation does not seem to have an effect. In their study, Andreoni and Rao hypothesize that the
reason for this may be that the content is too obvious (nearly half of the messages appealed
to fairness norms). However, also the number of observations is relatively small, since only 20
receivers were randomly matched to 20 dictators for two rounds. In our study, we focus on
one-sided, free-form communication from the receiver to the dictator and modify the design
in such a way that it has more power to find systematic differences in dictator’s behavior
resulting from differences in the content and form of the particular message. Primarily, this is
done by letting dictators make multiple binary giving decisions in response to a sequence of
messages sent by different receivers.
Mohlin and Johannesson (2008) compare the results of a dictator game in which the receiver
can either write a message to the dictator or not.3 They find that communication significantly
increases givings. Additionally, they used a treatment in which a third party sends a message
to the dictator to distinguish between a “content effect” and a “relationship effect.” Their
results indicate that both effects are important and increase givings by a similar magnitude.
Furthermore, Mohlin and Johannesson classified the messages into three categories (moral
reasons, personal arguments and non-argumentative content) but cannot find any differences
in giving behavior with respect to these categories.
Similar to one of the treatments by Andreoni and Rao (2011), Langenbach (2016) studies the
effect of a combination of a free-form message and a numerical request sent by the receiver in
3In their study, they used a double-blind procedure (see Hoffman et al., 1994).
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a dictator game. He also finds that givings are significantly higher with communication than
without communication. Differences between the numerical request and the messages as well
as in the content of the messages are not analyzed further in the paper.
Some studies have looked at the effect of communication in a dictator game without allowing
free-form communication. Charness and Rabin (2005) let receivers express their preference
about how they would like to be treated by either sending the message “Help me,” “Don’t
help me” or, in some cases, no message at all to dictators before dictators decided about the
allocation of funds in a series of simplified dictator games in which, similar to our experimental
design, only two allocations were possible. They find that more dictators chose the option
that benefitted the receiver when the receiver asked for help. Rankin (2006) allowed receivers
to request a certain amount of money to be given to them by the dictator. When the request
is for at most half of the total amount to be divided, the request has a positive effect on the
generosity of the dictator compared to a treatment without a request possibility. A request
for more than half, however, has a negative effect on the amount transferred by the dictators
to the receivers. This result has also been found by Andreoni and Rao (2011). In a similar
experiment without a control treatment, Yamamori et al. (2007) find nearly the same results:
For a request asking for less than half of the funds, higher requests increase givings. Letting
receivers only choose from a set of pre-written messages or letting them only request a certain
amount of money, as it is done in these studies, increases the internal validity of the results
because analyzing the data is straightforward. However, at the same time, it decreases the
external validity, since such a reduced form of communication does not capture the richness
of communication in the real world. Because we are interested in exactly these differences in
the content and the form of messages which may have an effect on the decision of dictators,
free-form communication is used in our study.
Andreoni et al. (2011) designed a field experiment resembling the lab experiment in Andreoni
and Rao (2011). In their study, solicitors for a fundraiser were positioned at one or both
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entrances of a supermarket. The solicitors either asked passersby verbally (“please give”) or
merely stood there. Actively asking strongly increased the share of people donating as well
as the average amount donated, but had the additional negative effect that people tried to
avoid the solicitor by using a different entrance or exit. The result that actively asking people
to donate increases givings has also been found by other authors using observational data
on charitable donations (Yo¨ru¨k, 2009; Meer and Rosen, 2011). Related to this, Sanders and
Smith (2016) conducted a field experiment in which lawyers asked clients during the process
of drawing up a will if they wanted to leave a bequest for a charitable cause. Lawyers were
randomly sorted into a “weak ask” treatment and a “strong ask” treatment. In the “weak
ask” treatment, clients were simply asked whether they wanted to leave something behind
for a charity, whereas in the “strong ask” treatment, clients were additionally told that most
clients had made such a charitable bequest (social norm) and that they should think about
a cause they felt passionate about (emotional factor). The authors find that in the “strong
ask” treatment the proportion of people that decided to leave a bequest to charity increased
significantly by 50% compared to the “weak ask” treatment.
Apart from the effect of communication on altruistic behavior in a dictator game, commu-
nication has been studied in the experimental literature in other experimental settings that
deal with social interactions, such as the public good game, and it has been shown that com-
munication increases cooperation (see, for example, Isaac and Walker, 1988, or Bochet et al.,
2006).4
Besides communication, there are several factors that affect the decision to give in a dictator
game which have been studied in the experimental literature so far. Relevant to our study
and the design of our experiment are the findings that decreasing the social distance between
the dictator and the receiver leads to more generous giving decisions (Bohnet and Frey, 1999;
4Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´ (2014) find that messages which appeal to moral norms and to the social benefit of
a high contribution significantly increase contributions in a public good game. In their experiment, messages
are not sent by other participants but by the experimenters themselves.
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Small and Loewenstein, 2003; Goeree et al., 2010; Hoffman et al., 1996)5 and increasing the
efficiency of a kind act by multiplying the money transferred from the dictator to the receiver
by a factor larger than one has a positive effect (Engel, 2011). Also, the demographics of the
dictators have an effect in such a way that, for instance, women tend to give more than men,
while students tend to give less than non-students (Ibid.).
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
In the experiment, we use a modified version of the dictator game. There are two types of
players, player A (the dictator) and player B (the receiver). Prior to the start of the ex-
periment, subjects are randomly assigned their role, which they keep for the duration of the
experiment. At the beginning of each round, A receives an endowment of 50 points, whereas
B receives an endowment of 20 points. Player A makes the binary decision either to keep the
endowments unchanged or to decrease her own points by 10 (to 40 points) while increasing
player B’s points by 20 (to 40 points). Thus, the decision to share the points increases the
sum of the points from 70 (50 + 20) to 80 (40 + 40). Table 1 illustrates the allocation of points
to A and B depending on A’s decision.
This simple game is played for multiple rounds. The number of rounds in a session is set
Table 1: Matrix of Endowments and Payoffs
A B Sum
Endowments 50 20 70
Payoffs if A decides not to share 50 20 70
Payoffs if A decides to share 40 40 80
5However, decreasing the anonymity of the dictator can also have a negative effect on generosity (Dufwen-
berg and Muren, 2006).
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in such a way that every A interacts with every B exactly once (absolute stranger matching).
For example, if there are 32 subjects in a session, i.e. 16 A’s and 16 B’s, the game is played
for 16 rounds. In the end, one of the rounds is randomly drawn. This round determines the
payoff of the subjects in the experiment. Eight sessions were conducted at the Laboratory for
Experimental Research of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (LERN) in June 2016. In six
of these sessions, 32 subjects took part, and in the remaining two sessions, 30 subjects took
part, which led to 252 subjects and 1,986 sharing decisions in total. Subjects were students,
and nearly 80.0% of these studied business and economics. On average, subjects were 23.5
years old and 50.4% of them were male.
In the first round, there is no communication between A and B. Thus, A’s decision in the first
round can be seen as a baseline decision. In each round after the first one, A receives a written
message from the matched subject B before making her decision. B writes his message only
once at the beginning of the experiment. B knows that this message will be shown to each
subject A, except for the subject A with whom he is matched in the first round. The reason
for not letting B write a message every round is that we are interested in the performance of
one message encountered by multiple A’s, whereas we are not interested in learning effects of
B. Subjects are told in the instructions that there are no restrictions regarding the content
of the message written by B except that they are not allowed to reveal their identity. The
maximum length of a message is limited to 300 characters.
In each session, subjects were randomly assigned a seat. At the beginning, they read the
instructions6 and had to complete a short quiz to ensure that everyone understood the exper-
iment.7 While the B’s wrote their messages, the A’s made their decisions for the first round
without communication and were then asked whether they could remember a situation in the
6An English translation of the originally German instructions can be found in the Appendix.
7The control questions can be found in the Appendix.
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real world that was similar to their task in the experiment.8 In the following rounds, the
A’s decided whether or not to share the points while viewing the message of the matched B
on-screen.9
Following the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire and received their payoff in pri-
vate. Points were converted to Euros at a rate of 5 Points = 1 Euro. Sessions lasted for
approximately 45 minutes and subjects earned on average 11.45 Euros, including a show-up
fee of 4 Euros. The experiment was computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the
recruitment process was conducted using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
To determine which aspects of the messages are particularly important for the sharing decision
of the dictator, the free-form text messages were analyzed and sorted into eight categories after
the main experiment took place. Some of the categories are specific to the particular design
of the experiment, others are more general. We followed the same procedure as in Andreoni
and Rao (2011) and let students from the same subject pool as in the main experiment decide
whether a message belonged to one or multiple predetermined categories.10
The eight categories are Friendly Greeting, Sum of Points, Equity, Decency, Power / Respon-
sibility, Humor, Need and Random Role. Messages sorted into the category Friendly Greeting
are characterized by a particularly friendly or polite greeting. The category Sum of Points
contains messages in which the receiver argues that sharing points with him will result in an
increase in the sum of points, an efficiency gain or a welfare improvement. When the receiver
8The reason for this was to make the experimental situation less abstract by thinking about a similar
situation from the real world. Most of the situational descriptions were about beggars asking for money or,
more generally, about solidarity within a society, a family or another group of people (e.g. friends, roommates).
9Screenshots of the decision screens for subjects A with and without communication can be found in the
Appendix.
1027 subjects took part in the rating session. They were divided into three groups consisting of 9 raters
each. Every rater read 42 (41 for the last group) messages and subsequently made her decision. The division
into groups was done to reduce the number of messages each subject had to rate because it was important
for us that raters took a lot of care and were concentrated when making their decision. Each message could
be sorted into one, multiple or no category. Subjects were told that their help was important for our research
and that they should take their time with their decisions. They earned 15 Euros for their participation. An
English translation of the instructions for the rating session can be found in the Appendix.
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tells the dictator that sharing her points will lead to an equal allocation of points, the message
is part of the category Equity. When the receiver appeals to the dictator to behave fairly
or decently, the message is sorted into the category Decency. Messages in which the receiver
argues that the dictator has the sole decision power and / or the sole responsibility for both
payments are sorted into the category Power / Responsibility. A particularly humorous mes-
sage is sorted into the category Humor. Messages sorted into the category Need are those in
which the receiver explains why he needs the money. Finally, when the receiver emphasizes in
his message that the role allocation was random, and that the dictator could also have been
a receiver or that the dictator should think about how she would like to be treated if she
were a receiver, the message is sorted into the category Random Role.11 Table A.1 in the Ap-
pendix describes the eight categories in detail and gives one example message for each category.
4 Predictions
A neoclassical dictator would neither share her points with B nor react to the message in
any way. Depending on her preferences, an inequity averse dictator (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) could decide to share her points with B. However, the content and
form of the message would have no effect for such an outcome-oriented individual. Contradict-
ing these theories, previous studies have already shown that, in general, a message does have
an effect on the dictator’s decision to share (Andreoni and Rao, 2011; Mohlin and Johannes-
son, 2008; Langenbach, 2016). In order to develop predictions regarding dictators’ systematic
11Regarding the categories used by Andreoni and Rao (2011), we adopted the categories Friendly Greeting
and Need. However, in our study, a friendly greeting is defined as being more formal than it is in the study
by Andreoni and Rao, in which it is defined as a “greeting usually used amongst friends.” The category
“Fairness” used in their study is divided into two categories, Equity and Decency. What Andreoni and Rao
called “Acknowledge Power” is called Power / Responsibility in our study to emphasize that receivers did not
only write about the power of the dictator but also about the dictator’s specific responsibility for both payoffs.
There were hardly any messages using “Flattery.” Hence, this category was not used in our study.
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reaction to the content and form of a message, behavioral models such as the intention-based
model of reciprocity (Rabin, 1993) are a good starting point.
4.1 Full Sample
A dictator who behaves reciprocally (Rabin, 1993) may, for one thing, value a humorous mes-
sage, a message which makes her smile or one which makes her feel good and, hence, is more
inclined to share her endowment with the author of such a message. Thus, a message that
has the potential to contribute to the dictator’s well-being (e.g. a message that starts with
a friendly greeting, is humorous or contains a smiley) has a higher probability of its request
being granted by the dictator. Such a dictator may also appreciate a message which shows
that the receiver put considerable effort into it. In other words, since the receiver has put
effort into writing the message, the dictator reciprocates and shares her points with B. On the
one hand, this can be done by writing a longer message with few or no spelling mistakes in
it. Therefore, we expect that longer messages and messages that contain fewer mistakes will
have a higher probability of success. On the other hand, a creative message, e.g. a humorous
message, shows effort on the part of the receiver as well. Of course, this effect would also work
the other way around. A message showing lack of effort by being shorter or containing more
spelling mistakes, for example, would have a lower chance of success.
Prediction 1: Messages with a friendly greeting, which are very humorous, which contain at
least one smiley or which are relatively long affect the sharing decision positively. Messages
which contain a lot of spelling mistakes affect the sharing decision negatively.
As mentioned in the literature overview in Section 2, feelings of empathy towards the person
in need may be the main driving force for altruistic actions. This relationship is also called the
empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991; Andreoni and Rao, 2011; Andreoni et al., 2011).
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Batson (1991) argues that both the “magnitude of the perceived need” as well as the “strength
of the attachment” to the other person increase the empathetic concern for this person. We
hypothesize that a message which contains reasons why the author needs the money serves
as an “empathetic stimulus” (Andreoni et al., 2011) since it makes a need salient and also
heightens the attachment to the other person by letting the dictator adopt the perspective
of the receiver. Furthermore, by increasing the empathic concern, such a message raises the
probability of an altruistic act.
Prediction 2: Messages which fall into the category Need, i.e. messages that give reasons for
why the money is needed, have a higher probability of success.
While increasing the feeling of empathy towards the receiver is one way how the content of the
message potentially influences the dictator’s decision to share, increasing the social pressure
for the dictator to behave according to social norms could be another way. It has been shown
that social pressure has a strong impact on generosity in the area of charitable donations
both in field experiments (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2011) as well as in field
data (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011; de Wit and Bekkers, 2016). People donate more if social
pressure increases.
Messages and their content can affect social pressure in two ways. On the one hand, there
is the explicit variant in which social norms are made more salient by appealing to the other
party to behave fairly and just. On the other hand, social pressure for the dictator can be
increased in a more subtle way, which is the implicit variant. In particular, mentioning the
power relationship between the dictator and the receiver and the dictator’s responsibility for
the outcome of both parties could increase the social pressure without being strongly demand-
ing. For example, Bran˜as-Garza (2007) show in a dictator game that including the sentence
“Note that he relies on you.” at the bottom of the instructions increases givings significantly.
Furthermore, the word “thanks” in a message which is mostly used in the end in a context such
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as “thanks in advance” may affect social pressure in the same subtle way. Thus, we expect
that dictators receiving messages that increase the social pressure will more often share their
points with the particular supplicant.
Prediction 3: Messages appealing to decency, emphasizing the power and responsibility re-
lationship or containing the word “thanks” will have a higher probability of success.
4.2 Gender differences
Women and men may react differently to the content and form of messages. First of all, there
is evidence that women react more strongly to social cues than men (Croson and Gneezy,
2009; Eagly, 1983). Moreover, Meer and Rosen (2011) analyze data of university alumnus
donations and find that the effect of a personal solicitation is stronger for women than for
men. Hence, we expect that women will react more strongly to the message by (a) having
a higher variance than men in their sharing decision when communication is present and (b)
increasing their generosity more than men when seeing a message compared to the baseline
round in which there is no message.
Prediction 4: (a) The average variance in the sharing decisions with communication will be
higher for female dictators than for male dictators. (b) The difference between the proportion
of dictators sharing their points in the baseline round and the average proportion of dictators
sharing their points in the following rounds will be higher for female dictators than for male
dictators.
In a dictator game, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) vary the budget and the relative price
for altruism. The relative price of altruism is the efficiency of a donation, i.e. how much the
beneficiary receives relative to what the donor has to give up. They find that men react more
strongly to the efficiency of a donation, i.e. they behave more altruistically than women when
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altruism is relatively “cheap” and less altruistically than women when altruism is relatively
“expensive.” This gender difference with respect to the relative price of a donation has also
been found in field data on charitable donations (Andreoni et al., 2003). The author of a
message can highlight this aspect and make it more salient by arguing that sharing the points
with the receiver increases the total sum of points and is, hence, welfare enhancing. We expect
that such a message will increase the likelihood of the dictator sharing the points with the
receiver when the dictator is a man. The effect may also be positive for women, but it would
be weaker than for men.
Prediction 5: Messages in which the author argues that giving will increase the sum of points
will have a positive effect on the likelihood of success for male dictators. The effect will be
smaller or even nonexistent for female dictators.
In the same study, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) show that for female dictators equity in
the payoffs is more important than it is for male dictators. Following the same line of argu-
mentation as above, we expect that a message which highlights the aspect that sharing points
leads to an equal allocation of points will increase the probability of a generous decision by
a female dictator. The effect may also be positive for men, but it would be weaker than for
women.
Prediction 6: Messages in which the receiver argues with the equity of payoffs due to sharing
the points with him will have a positive effect on the success probability for female dictators.
The effect will be smaller or even nonexistent for male dictators.
Our last prediction is about gender differences and the social pressure to give. Psychological
research (Eagly, 2009; Babcock and Laschever, 2003) has shown that gender-specific stereo-
types exist and that these stereotypes work not only by describing how men and women usually
behave (descriptive), but also by claiming how men and women should behave (prescriptive).
Hence, such a gender-specific role or stereotype serves as a social norm and men and women
15
are expected to behave accordingly, thereby creating social pressure to do so (Eagly, 2009;
Babcock and Laschever, 2003; de Wit and Bekkers, 2016). Since women are assumed to be
more caring, friendly and “other-oriented” (Deaux and Major, 1987; Babcock and Laschever,
2003; Eagly, 2009), women experience a higher social pressure to act in such a way, i.e. they
are expected to be more generous and help the person in need.12 Furthermore, they not only
experience a greater pressure to give, they may also react more strongly to a given level of
social pressure (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eagly, 1983). Following this argument, we hypoth-
esize that messages that increase the social pressure either in a straightforward way (decency)
or in a more subtle way (power and responsibility or containing the word “thanks”) will in-
crease the chance for a successful request more strongly if the dictator is a woman.
Prediction 7: The increase in the success probability of messages appealing to decency, em-
phasizing the power and responsibility relationship or containing the word “thanks” will be
higher for female dictators than for male dictators.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics about the Sharing Decision
Depending on the number of subjects in a session, each of the 126 subjects A decided 15 or
16 times over the allocation of points between subjects A and B. In the following, the obser-
vations belonging to the messages of three subjects B are excluded from the analysis,13 which
12However, for field data from the Netherlands, de Wit and Bekkers (2016) find no evidence that social
pressure can explain the different behavior of men and woman in donations.
13In the case of one subject B, there was a computer error which led to two messages being sent by this
subject. We cannot be sure which message appeared on As’ screen when deciding about the allocation of
points. Therefore, the observations associated with this subject B had to be excluded. Furthermore, two
subjects B wrote messages containing a deal offer in which they told the opposing party that they could meet
after the experiment and exchange the welfare gains from sharing. The observations associated with these
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leads to 1,941 allocation decisions, 126 without communication (from round 1) and 1,815 with
communication. Of all the 126 subjects A, 21 subjects (16.7%) always shared their points
with B, 24 subjects (19.0%) never shared their points with B and 81 subjects (64.3%) varied
their decisions to share.
In round 1, which is the baseline decision without communication, subjects A decided to share
the points in 31.0% of the cases, while after round 1 they shared their points in 47.7% of the
cases. The difference between the sharing decision without and the average sharing decision
with communication is highly significant for the whole sample (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
z = −5.03, p < 0.0001), as well as only for male A’s (z = −3.33, p = 0.0009) and only for
female A’s (z = −3.77, p = 0.0002). This finding suggests that communication as such has a
positive effect on the decision to share which is in line with the literature (Andreoni and Rao,
2011; Mohlin and Johannesson, 2008; Langenbach, 2016). However, as this is only a within-
subject treatment comparison, the result could potentially also arise due to an experimenter
demand effect (Zizzo, 2010), i.e. when subjects are under the impression that they have to
change their behavior due to the message now appearing on their screen. Over all rounds,
male A’s decided to share their points slightly more often than female A’s (50.6% compared
to 42.7%).14 However, this difference between male and female dictators is not statistically
significant (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test z = −1.17, p = 0.2407). There is a weak positive time
trend, as can be seen from Figure A.1 in the Appendix, i.e. dictators tend to be more generous
in later rounds.
messages are also excluded.
14In general, results from dictator games suggest that women behave more altruistically than men (Engel,
2011). In our setting, however, an altruistic act is relatively “cheap” or “efficient,” since sharing the points
costs only 2 Euros while increasing the receiver’s payoff by 4 Euros, which has been shown to increase the
likelihood of altruistic acts more for male dictators than for female dictators (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001).
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5.2 Message Analysis
In the following, we analyze 123 messages written by subjects B. Table 2 shows characteristics
of these messages for the whole sample, as well as for male and female B’s separately. On
Table 2: Objective Characteristics of Messages
Gender of writer
Variables Full Sample Male Female
Length (in characters) 219 216 222
Number of spelling mistakes 1.59 1.53 1.64
Message contains (dummy variables):
Smileys 0.65 0.61 0.69
The word “Please” 0.19 0.25 0.12
The word “Thanks” 0.23 0.28 0.17
Number of messages 123 64 59
Values in the table are averages for the full sample of mes-
sages, as well as for messages written by only male or female
B’s.
average, messages were 219 characters long and included 1.59 spelling mistakes. Of these,
65% contained at least one smiley, 19% contained the word “please”15 and 23% contained
the word “thanks.”16 There are no significant gender differences in these objective message
characteristics except for the use of the word “please,” which is used more frequently by male
receivers; this difference is only significant at a 10% significance level (Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test z = −1.859, p = 0.0630).
As explained in detail in Section 3, the content of the messages was analyzed by letting 9
independent subjects decide for every message whether it belonged to none, one or multiple
categories predetermined by us. For the following analysis the average rating is used, i.e. if,
for example, 8 of the 9 raters have decided that a message belongs in the category Need, this
15For “please,” different versions were counted (“bitte,” “bittescho¨n,” “bitten,” “please”).
16For “thanks,” different versions were counted (“danke,” “dankescho¨n,” “thanks,” “thank you,” “merci”).
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Table 3: Categories of Messages Resulting from the Rating Session
Gender of writer
Variables Full Sample Male Female
Equity 0.54 0.56 0.52
Decency 0.50 0.47 0.53
Friendly Greeting 0.42 0.41 0.42
Power / Responsibility 0.35 0.34 0.35
Sum of Points 0.32 0.37 0.26
Humor 0.31 0.30 0.32
Need 0.14 0.11 0.17
Random Role 0.14 0.15 0.12
Number of messages 123 64 59
Values in the table are averages for the full sample of
messages, as well as for messages written by only male
or female B’s.
message will have a rating of 8/9 in the category Need. Table 3 summarizes the results of the
rating session. An average message has a rating of 0.54 in the category Equity, which is the
most frequent category. Following this category in order of frequency are Decency, Friendly
Greeting, Power and Responsibility, Sum of Points, Humor, Need and Random Role, which is
mentioned the least often.17 Men appear to mention the increase in the sum of points more
often, while women tend to appeal to decent behavior and address their particular need more
often. However, these differences are not statistically significant.18 To sum up, there does not
seem to be a considerable difference between the writing behaviors of male and female receivers.
17Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the cross-correlation of all the message characteristics and categories. The
highest (positive) correlation is between the three categories Equity, Decency, and Power and Responsibility.
A factor analysis did not yield any additional insights.
18Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Sum of Points : z = −1.433, p = 0.1517; Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for
Decency : z = 1.504, p = 0.1325; Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Need : z = 0.666, p = 0.5055.
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Table 4: Logit Regression Results for Three Models for the Full Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
share share share
VARIABLES coef se coef se coef se
Message Categories:
Equity 0.144 (0.144) -0.042 (0.152) -0.065 (0.202)
Decency -0.013 (0.177) 0.079 (0.177) 0.093 (0.247)
Friendly Greeting 0.225** (0.093) 0.046 (0.101) 0.098 (0.134)
Power/Responsibility 0.534** (0.245) 0.416* (0.243) 0.674** (0.327)
Sum of Points 0.345** (0.141) 0.179 (0.135) 0.261 (0.178)
Humor 0.780*** (0.126) 0.491*** (0.126) 0.707*** (0.168)
Need 0.397** (0.156) 0.473*** (0.161) 0.627*** (0.212)
Random Role 0.369** (0.166) 0.239 (0.177) 0.180 (0.235)
Message Characteristics:
Length 0.002*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
# Spelling Mistakes -0.058* (0.030) -0.079** (0.039)
Smileys 0.339*** (0.083) 0.488*** (0.113)
Please -0.091 (0.092) -0.104 (0.124)
Thanks 0.159* (0.093) 0.211* (0.122)
Characteristics Dictator A:
Baseline Share 2.539*** (0.359)
Male 0.391 (0.294)
Age -0.022 (0.050)
Business/Economics 0.680* (0.404)
Empathy 1.403*** (0.376)
Period 0.030*** (0.009)
Constant -1.265*** (0.410) -1.510*** (0.429) -7.378*** (1.517)
Observations 1,815 1,815 1,815
Note: The dependent variable in all three regressions is share, which takes a value of 1 if
A decided to share the points. Robust standard errors (clustered on the level of subjects
A) in parentheses in the following column. All regressions include session dummies.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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5.3 Regression Results
Table 4 shows the results of a logistic regression19 in which the dependent variable is share, a
variable that takes the value of 1 if the dictator decided to share the points and 0 otherwise.
The first model in columns (1) and (2) includes only the category ratings of a message as
explanatory variables. The second model in columns (3) and (4) adds the objective char-
acteristics of a message as explanatory variables. A Wald Test rejects the joint hypothesis
that the category variables for the first model (Wald-statistic with 8 restrictions: χ2 = 56.84,
p < 0.0001) as well as the subjective category variables and objective characteristics variables
for the second model (Wald-statistic with 13 restrictions: χ2 = 68.21, p < 0.0001) are simul-
taneously equal to 0, i.e. the explanatory variables in the first and the second model do have
predictive power. Hence, the content and form of a message influence the decision to share.
Including the objective characteristics of a message as explanatory variables changes the co-
efficients for the category variables. Especially controlling for the length of a message has an
impact, since messages scoring high in the categories Sum of Points, Equity, Random Role,
Power / Responsibility and also - to a lesser extent - Decency and Friendly Greeting are on
average relatively long messages, as can be seen from the cross-correlation Table A.2 in the
Appendix. The length of a message, in turn, has a positive impact on the probability of a
successful request. Controlling for the use of smileys in a message, which has a positive impact
on the likelihood of sharing, increases the coefficient for Need since messages scoring high in
this category include on average fewer smileys. On the other hand, messages in the category
Humor use a lot of smileys and, hence, controlling for smileys decreases the estimated effect
for such a message.
In the third model in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4, characteristics of dictators A are in-
19Using a Probit model or an OLS model does not yield essentially different results. Table A.4 in the
Appendix shows regression results for a fixed effects model in which subjects A define the panel. The results
are mostly robust to the model used here.
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cluded as explanatory variables. The predicted effects of the explanatory variables regarding
the content and form of the messages change only slightly compared to the second model.
Unless otherwise stated, the third model is used in the following discussion of the results.
Regarding prediction 1, which states that dictators behave reciprocally and reward messages
that show effort (or creativity), the regression results confirm at least part of this prediction
strongly. The category Humor exhibits a positive and highly significant effect on the will-
ingness to share - one of the largest effects of all the categories. To provide an idea of the
magnitude of the effect, Figure 1 displays the average marginal effects of all eight categories
on the probability of success. The model predicts that, on average, a message with a rating of
Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects for the Full Sample
Note: The figure shows point estimates as well as 95% confidence intervals.
1 in the category Humor has a success probability that is roughly 12 percentage points higher
than a message with a rating of 0 in this category. Looking now at smileys in a message,
Table 4 shows that a smiley has a positive and highly significant effect on the probability that
a dictator shares her points. This effect is estimated to be above 8 percentage points. In line
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with the prediction, longer messages affect the sharing decision positively.20 The effect is also
highly significant. Additionally, spelling mistakes in a message are punished by the dictator
by reducing her willingness to share (significant at a 5% level). These findings support predic-
tion 1. However, we do not find a positive effect that is significantly different from 0 for the
category Friendly Greeting - at least as long as we control for the objective characteristics of
a message - which is not in line with our prediction.
Result 1: Messages with a high rating in the category Humor, messages which contain at
least one smiley and messages which are relatively long affect the sharing decision positively,
while messages containing spelling mistakes affect the decision negatively. We do not find
significant evidence for a positive effect of a friendly greeting.
As for prediction 2, which states that a message containing reasons why the additional money
is needed heightens the empathetic concern and, in turn, increases the probability of a kind
action, our results seem to support this prediction. There is clear evidence that messages
mentioning the specific need of the receiver result in a higher chance of the dictator sharing
her points with the particular receiver. In fact, the model predicts an increase in the success
likelihood by 10.7 percentage points for a message with a rating of 1 in the category Need,
compared to a message with a 0 in this category, as can be seen in Figure 1. This positive
effect is highly significant.
Result 2: Messages belonging to the category Need have a higher probability of success.
For prediction 3, that social pressure affects the dictator’s decision to give, our data shows a
mixed picture. On the one hand, the category Decency, which contains messages that remind
the dictator explicitly of social norms and to behave according to them, has a very small
positive effect on the sharing decision, which is far from being significantly different from 0.
On the other hand, messages that fall in the Power and Responsibility category, thereby in-
20The coefficient is relatively small because the length is measured in characters.
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creasing social pressure in a more subtle way, affect the decision to share much more strongly.
This effect is large - an increase in the success probability of 11.5 percentage points for a
message with a rating of 1 compared to a rating of 0 in this category is predicted by the model
- and statistically significant. Messages containing the word “thanks” seem to have a higher
success chance, which would support our prediction. This effect, however, is only statistically
significant at the 10% level (p = 0.083).
Result 3: Messages emphasizing the power and responsibility relationship have a higher prob-
ability of success. Using the word “thanks” in a message seems to have a positive effect as
well. There is no significant effect of messages appealing to decency on a dictator’s willingness
to share.
We find no statistically significant effects for the categories Sum of Points, Equity and Random
Role on the likelihood that the dictator will share her points. For Sum of Points (p = 0.143)
and Random Role (p = 0.444), the estimated effects are positive but only statistically sig-
nificant at a 5% significance level when not controlling for the observable characteristics of a
message - in particular, the length of a message. For Equity, however, the estimated effect
is even negative, while being very close to 0. Although every child is taught that the word
“please” is mandatory or at least expected when asking someone a favor in a polite way, sur-
prisingly, the model predicts that using “please” in a message does not improve the dictator’s
willingness to act kindly.
Considering the characteristics of the dictator, our data confirms that dictators who shared
their points in the baseline round without communication are clearly more inclined to share
their points also in the later rounds when communication is present. Male dictators and
dictators who study business and economics seem to be more generous; however, this is not
statistically significant for the gender of the dictator and only significant at a 10% level for
the dictator’s field of study. Part of the post-experimental questionnaire was an Interpersonal
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Reactivity Index21 (Davis, 1983), which serves as an individual measure of empathy. This
empathy measure shows the expected effect: Subjects who score higher on this empathy mea-
sure are more willing to share. Furthermore, the willingness to share increases in later rounds.22
5.4 Different Behavior of Male and Female Dictators
Regarding prediction 4, we find that the average variance in the sharing decision with commu-
nication is slightly higher for female A’s than for male A’s (σ¯2Female = 0.1165 > 0.1032 = σ¯
2
Male).
However, this difference is far from being statistically significant (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
z = 0.666, p = 0.5055). On average, communication increases the proportion of dictators that
share their points by 17.3 percentage points if the dictator is a woman, and by 16.1 percentage
points if the dictator is a man.23 Similarly to the case above, this difference is not statistically
significant (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test z = 0.287, p = 0.7739).
Result 4: We do not find statistically significant evidence in our setting that women react
more strongly to this particular form of a social cue than men. Neither do women display a
higher variance in their sharing decision than men, nor do women increase their willingness
to share with vs. without communication more than men.
However, men and women do react differently to particular aspects of the message, as hypoth-
esized in the predictions section. Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the results of a logistic
regression using the same model as before (third model in Table 4), once only for male dic-
21The Interpersonal Reactivity Index consists of 28 items on a 5-point Likert scale. It is calculated by taking
the average of the responses (9 out of 28 items are scored in reverse order). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index
has a scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of 0.846.
22Since every message is shown to exactly one A in each round in random order, the positive time trend is
not a problem when analyzing the effect of these messages.
23For every A, the difference between his or her average decision with communication and his or her decision
without communication is calculated. Then, averages of this difference for male and female A’s are calculated
and compared.
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(a) Men (b) Women
Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects for Male and Female Dictators
Note: The figures show point estimates as well as 95% confidence intervals.
tators in column (1) and once only for female dictators in column (2). Figure 2 displays the
average marginal effects for the eight categories for male as well as female dictators resulting
from the logistic regression in Table A.3.
Prediction 5 stated that men react more strongly to arguments concerning the efficiency of
sharing the points. Our results support this prediction. For male dictators, the effect on the
success probability is positive, statistically significant and relatively large; an increase of 9.6
percentage points is predicted by the model for a message that has a rating of 1 in the category
Sum of Points compared to having a rating of 0 in that category. For female dictators, on the
other hand, the effect is negative but not statistically different from 0.
Result 5: Messages which argue that sharing points will increase the sum of points have a
positive effect on the willingness to share only for male dictators.
Prediction 6 was about gender-specific reactions to an equity argument, such that women are
more inclined to share their points when the receiver argues that this will lead to equal pay-
ments. We do not find any evidence in favor of this prediction. The point estimates for the
effect of Equity on the probability of success are negative for both sexes and far from being
statistically different from 0 (p = 0.946 for men, p = 0.658 for women).
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Result 6: We do not find a significant gender difference in the reaction to messages in which
the writer argues on the basis of the equity of payoffs that will result.
Concerning prediction 7, that women react more strongly to social pressure, the results are
similar to the case of social pressure for the full sample. On the one hand, appealing to decency,
an explicit way to make social norms more salient and, thereby, increasing social pressure, has
no significant effect on the sharing decision for both sexes. On the other hand, we do find clear
differences in the behaviors of female and male dictators when we look at more subtle forms of
increasing social pressure, i.e. mentioning the power and responsibility relationship and using
the word “thanks” in the message. For both of these variables, the effects are very close to
0 for male dictators (p = 0.834 for Power and Responsibility, p = 0.764 for “thanks”) while
being positive for female dictators. Particularly for the category Power and Responsibility,
the effect is very large; the model predicts an increase in the success probability of nearly 25
percentage points if a message has a rating of 1 in this category, compared to a rating of 0
for female dictators. Both of these effects are statistically significant (p < 0.001 for Power
and Responsibility, p = 0.018 for “thanks”). Hence, the statistically significant effects of the
category Power and Responsibility and of the word “thanks” on the willingness to share in
the full sample are solely driven by female dictators.
Result 7: Messages which emphasize the power and responsibility relationship or which con-
tain the word “thanks” have a positive effect on the willingness to share only for female dicta-
tors. There is no significant gender difference in the reaction to messages appealing to decency.
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5.5 Different Behavior of Dictators Depending on Their Baseline
Decision
Table A.3 in the Appendix additionally displays regression results divided according to dic-
tators who did or did not share their points in the baseline round (columns (3) and (4)). A
dictator who shared her points in the baseline round without communication is already in-
clined to share her points with the receiver and has to be actively dissuaded from sharing by
the message. A dictator who did not share her points in the baseline round without commu-
nication is less inclined to share her points and, thus, has to be actively convinced to share
by the message. It may be that different aspects of a message can either dissuade a dictator
from sharing or convince a dictator to share.
The results indicate that an argument concerning the sum of points is only successful when
trying to convince a dictator to behave kindly who did not share her points without commu-
nication. There do not seem to be other substantial differences in the behavior of dictators
who either shared or did not share their points in the baseline round.
6 Summary and Discussion
First of all, the content and form of the receiver’s request influence the dictator’s decision
to give. This result is additionally supported by statements from dictators in the post-
experimental questionnaire in which they were asked how they came to their decision. Ten
dictators mentioned that even though they had planned to either never share their points or
always share their points, they changed their minds after reading particularly “good” or “bad”
messages.
When asked in the questionnaire about what influenced their decision, dictators most com-
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monly gave answers related to our prediction 1, i.e. to what we argue is a reciprocity effect.
They said they were more inclined to share their points when a message was nice and friendly
so that the writer seemed more likeable (41 mentions), when the message was creative (23
mentions), funny and humorous (21 mentions), thoughtful and showed effort (12 mentions) or
contained few mistakes (6 mentions). This is also what we find in the data. Messages that
show that the writer put effort into it by being creative and writing a funny and humorous
message or by writing a long message without mistakes have a higher chance of success. Al-
though not requiring much effort, including smileys in a message seems to make the message
friendlier and the writer more likeable. Hence, the evidence suggests that there are dictators
who behave reciprocally in such a way that they are more likely to do something for the
receiver, i.e. sharing their points with him, after reading a message mainly characterized by
friendliness, creativity and effort.
We can only speculate as to why a friendly greeting has no effect on the decision of a dictator.
One dictator wrote in the questionnaire that she does not like a greeting that is too formal
or polite and prefers to receive a rather casual greeting. This could be an explanation for
this result; an explanation that would, however, be specific to this particular setting and to
this particular subject group. The same argument may be valid for our result that the use
of the word “please” has no positive effect. In a different setting or with a subject group
consisting not only of students, the effect may be positive. However, messages containing the
word “please” may also be too demanding on average, a trait that subjects did not like in the
messages, according to statements in the questionnaire (7 mentions).
The fact that explaining why the money is needed has a sizeable positive effect suggests that
feelings of empathy which are stimulated by personal attachment to the person in need and
knowledge about the specific need are important for altruistic behavior. However, while ex-
plaining the particular need has a positive effect on generosity, a message inducing pity or
showing obvious signs of begging was mentioned most often in the questionnaire as a reason
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for not sharing the points with a receiver (14 mentions).
In the case of social pressure, there appears to be a clear difference in the reaction of the
dictators between explicit forms of social pressure on the one hand and implicit forms on the
other. Messages which increase social pressure in a very subtle and implicit way without being
demanding have a positive effect on the dictator’s decision to share. This effect is driven solely
by female dictators. However, increasing social pressure explicitly by prescribing to the other
party how to behave has no significant effect at all and there is no gender difference in this
case. In line with this result, several dictators mentioned in the questionnaire that they did
not like messages which were too demanding or which told them explicitly how they should
behave or what they should do (9 mentions). In this laboratory setting, it is relatively easy to
avoid such an explicit form of social pressure or to even punish it due to the anonymity and
since clicking twice is enough to let a message disappear. Hence, it is likely that the effect of
explicit and direct social pressure is different in settings in which avoidance is more difficult,
as it is the case in most real-life interactions (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2011).
Arguing for sharing the points to result in equal payoffs has no significant effect on the decision
to share, neither for male dictators nor for female dictators. A reason for this finding may
be that in our setting it is too obvious that sharing leads to equal payoffs and, thus, it is not
possible for a receiver to make this aspect more salient by mentioning it in his message.
Our results indicate a clear difference when faced with an argument mentioning the increase in
total points or the efficiency of sharing the points. Men react positively to such an argument,
while women show no reaction. Due to the fact that our subject pool mainly consists of busi-
ness and economics students, it could very well be that the effect of the efficiency argument is
stronger in this case than it would be in a sample which is more representative of the general
population (Engelmann and Strobel, 2006; Fehr et al., 2006). However, since the proportion
of business and economics students is similarly high for male and female A’s (78 % of the
female A’s and 82 % of the male A’s study business and economics), the different reactions to
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the efficiency argument cannot be explained by our particular subject pool. It is also possible
that the appeal for equity would work better if the subject pool consisted of fewer business
and economics students (Engelmann and Strobel, 2006; Fehr et al., 2006).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we implemented free-form written communication in a modified dictator game
and analyzed its effect on the dictators’ decision to share. The content as well as the form of
a message have a clear effect on the dictator’s decision. Humorous and friendly messages, as
well as messages that show that the author exerted more effort, lead to reciprocal behavior
from the dictator, i.e. she is more willing to share. Mentioning the receiver’s specific need also
increases generosity. Only men react positively to an efficiency argument, whereas creating
subtle social pressure increases sharing only if the dictator is female.
Our research supports the results of Andreoni and Rao (2011), Mohlin and Johannesson (2008)
and Langenbach (2016) that communication has a positive effect on dictators’ willingness to
act kindly. Furthermore and most importantly, we fill the gap in analyzing systematic reac-
tions of dictators in response to certain aspects of written communication, which, to the best
of our knowledge, has not been done before in this level of detail. Additionally, our research
contributes to the current research on gender differences in the area of altruism (Andreoni and
Vesterlund, 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; de Wit and Bekkers, 2016).
Concerning research on altruism, our results indicate that several factors are vital for altruistic
behavior. First of all, if people feel like they get something in return for their generosity -
and it may be just something to smile about - or if people feel like the receiver at least tried
their best, they are willing to help. Secondly, empathetic feelings towards the person in need
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are also important for altruism. Finally, social pressure has an effect, even in the artificial
and anonymous situation of a laboratory experiment. However, this effect is driven solely
by women, presumably because social norms expect women to be kind and caring. It would
be interesting to study whether a similar gender difference can be found for explicit forms of
social pressure in real-life settings in which it is harder to avoid or punish social pressure.
Primarily, our results are relevant for numerous everyday life situations in which one party
asks another one a favor. Additionally, such diverse fields as charity work, negotiations and
marketing might benefit from our findings. Our setting differs considerably from the negoti-
ation setting, in which usually both parties attempt to benefit from an agreement, whereas
in our setting one party may help the other party without a monetary benefit for herself.
However, since negotiating is about convincing the other party with specific arguments, it is
likely that at least some of our findings are transferable to this area. The same may hold for
marketing, since marketing is likewise to a large extent about convincing somebody (i.e. a
customer) to do something (i.e. to buy the product). Thus, our findings regarding arguments
that convince dictators to be more generous may be interesting for negotiations and marketing
as well.
Especially for charity work, it is important to distinguish between content- and relationship-
effects when using our results, since the person who asks a favor is not the person who benefits
from the favor in that case. It is very likely that relationship-specific effects, which result from
certain aspects of communication that are targeted at the direct relationship between potential
beneficiaries and benefactors, are mitigated if an intermediary tries to convince a potential
benefactor instead of the potential beneficiary of the favor herself. Future research may study
the effect of communication in a setting in which an intermediary asks a favor and analyze
any differences from our findings. Other potentially fruitful areas for future research include
testing the external validity of our findings by conducting field experiments which further
analyze the effect of communication, e.g. in the domain of charitable giving. Furthermore,
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our subject pool consists only of students, most of whom study business and economics, which
makes it a rather specific subject pool. Hence, the generalizability of our results should also
be tested in future studies.
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Table A.1: Message Categories
Category Description Example Message (translated from German)
Equity Changing the score of
points leads to an equal
distribution of points.
“...and accomplish identical payments for
both of us. Please reduce your endowment
by 10 points, so that 20 points are added to
my endowment and that there is equity in
payments. ...”
Decency Appealing to A to
behave fair and decent
“Please be fair and distribute justly,... .
Please do not be selfish and inconsiderate,
since you would harm me that way and
leave with a bad conscience in the end.”
Friendly
Greeting
Friendly or polite
address
“Hello dear participant A, ...”
Power/
Responsi-
bility
A has the sole decision
power but also the sole
responsibility for both
payments.
“I cannot overrule your decision and maybe
not even influence it. ... THE CHOICE IS
YOURS :)”
Sum of
Points
B argues with an
efficiency gain, i.e. an
increase in the sum of
points.
“... Please share your points with me! That
way, the overall welfare will increase. You
will receive a little less, in return I get a
little more. In total, this would put the two
of us in a better position. ...”
Humor The message is
particularly humorous
“Two economists are on a quest for personal
happiness (i.e. the maximum utility). Let
us do it: Let’s increase the overall welfare!
In favor of shifting the aggregated budget
line, towards higher indifference curves,
until we reach the heaven of the best
possible Nash equilibrium.”
Need B explains why he needs
the points / money
“Hi. On the weekend, I would like to visit
my girlfriend. In order to do this, I need
some money to buy a bus ticket. So please
be a bit fair and share your points with me.
Do it for the sake of Love. :)”
Random
Role
B mentions the random
allocation of roles and /
or how A would feel
being a B.
“...Perhaps you keep in mind that you could
find yourself in my position and you would
surely be glad about a friendly A.”
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Table A.3: Logit Regression Results for Subsamples
Gender Decision Round 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Men Women Baseline=1 Baseline=0
Message Categories:
Equity -0.022 -0.120 -0.179 0.061
(0.316) (0.272) (0.332) (0.257)
Decency 0.163 0.079 -0.039 -0.070
(0.399) (0.336) (0.412) (0.301)
Friendly Greeting 0.122 0.091 0.145 0.062
(0.186) (0.202) (0.399) (0.148)
Power / Responsibility -0.116 1.449*** 1.031 0.510
(0.557) (0.388) (0.770) (0.379)
Sum of Points 0.605** -0.025 -0.469 0.366*
(0.243) (0.253) (0.320) (0.207)
Humor 0.584*** 0.905*** 0.850** 0.695***
(0.225) (0.243) (0.342) (0.198)
Need 0.605* 0.693** 0.776* 0.669***
(0.335) (0.295) (0.434) (0.251)
Random Role -0.041 0.366 0.541 0.172
(0.374) (0.326) (0.554) (0.271)
Message Characteristics:
Length 0.003*** 0.003* 0.006*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# Spelling Mistakes -0.105* -0.064 -0.199** -0.061
(0.056) (0.058) (0.078) (0.043)
Smileys 0.574*** 0.444** 0.880*** 0.387***
(0.145) (0.173) (0.247) (0.123)
Please 0.015 -0.214 0.159 -0.133
(0.183) (0.187) (0.363) (0.140)
Thanks 0.063 0.357** 0.579 0.157
(0.209) (0.151) (0.495) (0.136)
Period 0.040*** 0.025** 0.044** 0.032***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011)
Constant -6.917** -7.258*** -7.433*** -8.308***
(2.688) (1.868) (2.872) (2.295)
Observations 893 922 501 1,254
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is share, which takes a value of 1
if A decided to share the points. Robust standard errors (clustered on the level of
subjects A) in parentheses. All regressions include session dummies and control for
individual characteristics of dictator A (see Table 4).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.4: Robustness Check: Logit Regression Results for a Subject Fixed Effects Model
Gender
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full Sample Men Women
Message Categories:
Equity 0.161 0.389 0.022
(0.309) (0.461) (0.422)
Decency -0.170 -0.315 -0.032
(0.448) (0.645) (0.631)
Friendly Greeting 0.194 0.232 0.191
(0.228) (0.341) (0.314)
Power / Responsibility 0.890 -0.254 1.834**
(0.571) (0.842) (0.793)
Sum of Points 0.396 1.034** -0.138
(0.293) (0.443) (0.402)
Humor 1.165*** 1.135*** 1.238***
(0.293) (0.438) (0.403)
Need 1.195*** 1.231*** 1.166***
(0.317) (0.477) (0.429)
Random Role 0.331 0.161 0.455
(0.368) (0.547) (0.508)
Message Characteristics:
Length 0.005*** 0.005** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
# Spelling Mistakes -0.133** -0.158 -0.127
(0.067) (0.102) (0.091)
Smileys 0.726*** 0.722** 0.720***
(0.193) (0.287) (0.268)
Please -0.200 -0.073 -0.345
(0.218) (0.320) (0.302)
Thanks 0.356* 0.074 0.578**
(0.196) (0.294) (0.268)
Period 0.050*** 0.071*** 0.036
(0.017) (0.026) (0.024)
Observations 1,124 488 636
Number of Subjects 78 34 44
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is share which
takes a value of 1 if A decided to share the points. The panel is
defined by subjects A.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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A.2 Instructions and Control Questions
Instructions for Participants of the Main Experiment
The following section provides the english translation of the originally german instructions
which the participants received in the main experiment:
General Instructions
Today, you are participating in a decision-experiment. If you read the following instructions
carefully, you can earn money. The payment you receive depends on your decisions and the
decisions of other participants.
During the whole experiment, it is not allowed to communicate with other participants.
Thus, we ask you not to talk to each other. Please turn off your mobile phone as well. Breaking
these rules will lead to exclusion of the experiment and the payment.
In case there is something you do not understand, please take another look at these in-
structions or give us a hand signal. We will come to your seat and answer your question
personally.
During the experiment, we talk about points instead of Euros. The points you earned in
the course of the experiment will be converted into Euros as follows:
5 points = 1 Euro
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the earned points, converted into Euros, in
cash. For being on time, you will receive an additional 4 Euros.
On the following pages, we will explain the experiment to you in detail. Before the start
of the experiment, we will ask you a few control questions on screen which are supposed
to help you understand the procedure. The experiment only starts when all participants
are completely familiar with the procedure of the experiment and have answered the control
questions correctly.
The Experiment
In the experiment, you and the other participants each take on a role. There are two
different role types. Half of the participants is participant A, the other half is participant B.
Your role will be assigned to you randomly at the beginning of the experiment. You only
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decide for your role and you keep this role for the whole experiment. In the following, a
participant who takes on role A will be called participant A.
The experiment consists of several rounds in which you interact with alternating partic-
ipants. In each round, the computer program selects groups of two at random of all the
participants present. Each group consists of exactly one participant A and one participant B.
Every round, new groups are randomly selected in such a way that you will always be matched
with a participant with whom you have not interacted yet. Neither you nor the other parti-
cipants get to know something about the identities of the participants in the groups; neither
before nor after the experiment.
The experiment ends as soon as every participant A has interacted with every participant
B once. If there are, for example, 20 participants in this experiment, i.e. 10 participants A
and 10 participants B, the experiment will end after 10 rounds. Thus, in every round you are
matched with a participant with whom you have not interacted yet.
As soon as the experiment starts, you will be informed about your role and the number of
rounds on screen.
Round 1
At the beginning of each round, all participants of this experiment receive an endowment
of points. Each participant A receives 50 points, each participant B receives 20 points. Now
participant A can decide whether she wants to change the score of points as follows:
• Participant A can reduce her own points from 50 to 40 points which leads to an increase
of participant B’s points from 20 to 40.
• Participant A can keep her own 50 points; then, participant B also keeps his 20 points.
From round 2 on
As in round 1, participant A can decide about changing the score of points.
Before participant A decides about a possible change of the score of points, participant B
sends a text message to participant A. The maximum length of the message is 300 characters.
Being a participant B, you may write whatever you like with the only exception that you are
not allowed to give any information about your identity. Participant A reads this message
before she decides about a possible change of points.
The message that participant B sends to participant A is written only once, namely in
round 1. In round 1, this message is not shown but from round 2 on, the message is shown to
the matched participant A in the respective round.
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Thus, participants B only take an active part in the experiment once (in the first round).
In the other rounds, they do not write messages anymore. However, at the end of every round,
they are informed about their payoff in points in this round.
Payment
At the end of the experiment, the computer program will choose one of the
previously carried out rounds at random. Only the group composition of this
selected round and only the decision of participant A for this round are relevant
for your payment. For the other rounds, which are not selected, you will not receive any
payment. The first round, in which participant A makes a decision without having received
a message from participant B before, is equally likely to be selected as every other round.
Thus, as a participant A, you should decide very carefully in every round because only after
the experiment, you will learn which of your decisions is relevant for the payment. As a
participant B, you should think carefully about your message in the first round because, from
round 2 on, every participant A you interact with reads this message.
After you have made all decisions, you will learn which round has been selected by the
computer program for the payment. Participants A get to know whether they decided for a
change of points in this particular round and which payment they receive. Participants B get
to know whether their points have been changed by the respective participant A and which
payment they receive.
Following the experiment, we are going to ask you to fill in a questionnaire. Then, you will
receive your payment in cash. Points are converted to Euro at an exchange rate of 5 points
for 1 Euro.
Control Questions in the Main Experiment
The following section provides the english translation of the originally german control ques-
tions which were shown to all participants and had to be answered correctly by all participants
before the start of the main experiment:
• “If participant A decides not to change the score of points, participant A will receive 50
points and participant B will receive 20 points.” (TRUE)
• “If participant A decides to change the score of points, participant A will receive 50
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points and participant B will receive 40 points.” (FALSE)
• “In the end of each round, participant B learns which decision participant A made in
this round.” (TRUE)
• “In the beginning of each round, participant B can send a message to participant A.”
(FALSE)
• “Every round is paid out.” (FALSE)
Instructions for Participants of the Rating Session
The following section provides the english translation of the originally german instructions
which the participants received in the rating session:
General Instructions
We welcome you at LERN. Thank you very much for being here today.
Please notice: During the whole stay in the laboratory, it is not allowed to communicate
with other participants. Thus, we ask you not to talk to each other. Please turn off your
mobile phone as well. If you have any questions, please give us a hand signal. We will come
to your seat and answer your question personally.
Your task today is the following:
A while ago, we conducted an experiment in which one part of the participants could write
messages to the other participants. We would like you to read those messages and sort them
into one or several categories.
At the end of the task, you will receive a payment of 15 Euros in cash.
On the next page, you find the instructions of the conducted experiment. Please read these
instructions carefully to make sure that the context of the messages becomes clear.
The independent categorisation is an important part of our project. We appreciate your
collaboration very much.
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- Instructions of the main experiment -
Your task today
You are going to read messages on screen which have been written by a participant B of
the experiment explained above. You should sort these messages into the following categories:
• Friendly greeting
Participant B addresses participant A in a very friendly or polite way.
• B argues with an efficiency gain due to a change of the score of points.
In this context, efficiency gain means that the sum of points of participant A and B
increases due to a change of points, i.e. the “pie” that is divided becomes larger.
• B uses equity as an argument.
By changing the score of points the points are distributed evenly. Participant A and B
will only receive the same number of points if A decides to change the points.
• B asks A to act decently.
Participant B appeals to participant A to act friendly or fair, for instance by appealing
to A’s conscience.
• B emphasises that A bears the responsibility for both payments.
Participant B notices that participant A has the exclusive power to make decisions. He
may explicitly point out to A that because of her special responsibility she should make
her decision very responsibly.
• The message is particularly humorous.
This category includes, for example, messages in which participant B tells a joke. How-
ever, you can also sort messages into this category that you believe to be particularly
humorous for other reasons.
• B explains why he needs the points / the money urgently.
Participant B mentions his special need and his dependency on the income from the
experiment. In this context he might also explain specifically, what he would spend the
additional points on.
• B mentions the random allocation of roles and / or how A would feel being
a B.
Messages belonging to this category are about the random allocation of role A and role
B in the beginning of the experiment. Participant A could have become a participant B
with the same probability.
Important: You can sort each message into none, one or several categories!
49
A.3 Decision Screens of Participant A
Figure A.2: Decision Screen of Participant A in the First Round
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Figure A.3: Decision Screen of Participant A from Round 2 on.
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